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When a contract is breached, both U.S. and U.K. law provide that the nonbreaching party should be made whole. The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”)
provides that “[t]he remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed.”1 The English version, going back to Robinson v.
Harman, is “that where a party sustains a loss by reason of breach of contract, he
is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to
damages, as if the contract had been performed.”2 I propose a general principle
that should guide implementation—the contract is an asset and the problem is
one of determining the change in value of that asset at the time of the breach.
In the simplest case—i.e., the breach of a contract for the sale of a
commodity in a thick market—the change in the value of the asset is simply the
contract-market differential; the contract-as-asset notion does not add much. It
becomes more useful as we move away from that extreme—e.g., imperfect
substitutes, future deliveries, or long-term contracts. Thus, for example, it makes
little sense to talk of the contract-market differential if the buyer repudiated a 20year take-or-pay contract in the third year.
Two caveats. First, I am referring only to direct damages: what are the
damages if one of the parties does not go through with the transaction?
Consequential damages and breach of warranty raise different questions. 3
Second, the damage rule should be viewed as the price of the option to terminate.
* Jerome L. Greene Professor of Transactional Law, Emeritus, Columbia Law School. Email:
vpg@law.columbia.edu
1. U.C.C. § 1-305 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
2. (1848) 154 Eng. Rep. 363.
3. For my analyses of consequential damages, see VICTOR GOLDBERG, RETHINKING CONTRACT LAW
AND CONTRACT DESIGN 87–133 (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2015) and VICTOR GOLDBERG, RETHINKING
THE LAW OF CONTRACT DAMAGES 165–227 (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2019). In both countries, courts
have blurred the line between direct and consequential damages. See GOLDBERG, RETHINKING THE LAW OF
CONTRACT DAMAGES, supra at 165–98.
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Parties might choose to make that price explicit, perhaps with liquidated
damages.4 Or they might choose different prices depending on whether the
termination was deliberate (exercising an option) or not intentional. In the
absence of an explicit exit price, the make-whole rule becomes the default option
price.
I will use the contract-as-asset approach to consider some doctrinal questions
in U.S. and U.K. law. Framing the question in this way means that damages
should be assessed at the date of breach. Ideally, post-breach facts would be
irrelevant. This is not a new notion—the Privy Council so held over a century
ago. The buyer had refused to take securities after the price had fallen.
Subsequently, the price had risen, and the seller had sold them at the higher price.
The issue, said the Privy Council, was this:
In a contract for sale of negotiable securities, is the measure of damages
for breach the difference between the contract price and the market price
at the date of the breach–or is the seller bound to reduce the damages if
he can, by subsequent sales at better prices? If he is, and if the purchaser
is entitled to the benefit of subsequent sales, it must also be true that he
must bear the burden of subsequent losses. The latter proposition is in
their Lordship’s’ opinion impossible and the former is equally unsound.5
However, the principle is not always honored. In both countries, there has
been some confusion regarding the role of post-breach information. In the U.S.,
one issue is the relationship between cover and market damages. If the resale
price has risen after a buyer’s breach, and the seller subsequently resells the
goods after the breach, some courts and commentators argue that granting market
damages could result in a windfall for the seller. This is typically framed as a
possible conflict between UCC § 2-706 and UCC § 2-708(1). When damages are
viewed as the change in the value of the asset, cover should be treated not as an
alternative measure, but as evidence; the apparent conflict disappears. The covermarket relationship will be discussed in Part I.
The English analog to the cover-market question is the notion of an available
market in the Sale of Goods Act §§ 50(3) and 51(3). If there is an available
market, the damage remedy would be the contract-market differential. But the
courts have had some difficulty determining whether there is an available market
and, if not, how damages should be assessed. This will be discussed in Part II.
The cover versus market question of Part I raised the question: what weight
should be given to a subsequent transaction when assessing damages? A related
question concerns measuring damages for the anticipatory repudiation of a

4. For illustrations, see GOLDBERG, RETHINKING CONTRACT LAW AND CONTRACT DESIGN, supra note 3,
at 10–19.
5. Jamal v. Moolla Dawood Sons & Co [1916] 1 AC 175, 179 (PC). For a more recent American case
involving damages for non-delivery of securities, see Kearl v. Rausser, 293 Fed. App’x 592 (10th Cir. 2008).
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contract. There are two variants on this: (a) the repudiation occurs before the time
for performance, but the litigation takes place after the date of performance; and
(b) the performance was to continue past the date the litigation would be
resolved. The U.S. treatment of these problems will be the focus of Part III.
Suppose that a force majeure event occurred after the repudiation but before
the decision. Should the court take this new information into account? The
contract-as-asset answer is straightforward: no. However, recent decisions in the
U.K. have held otherwise. The House of Lords rejected the breach-date measure
in The Golden Victory.6 And a decade later, the Supreme Court affirmed that
holding in Bunge v. Nidera.7 In The Golden Victory, the probability of the
excusing event at the time of the repudiation was low, while in Bunge it was very
high. In both cases, the post-repudiation facts should have been irrelevant. Part
IV critiques the two decisions.
I. COVER
In a contract for the sale of goods, when the buyer breaches, the UCC
provides two alternative damage remedies and that has led to some confusion.
Section 2-706 allows the seller to resell the goods (to cover) and reckons the
damages as the difference between the contract price and the price at which the
goods were sold. Section 2-708(1) provides for the market-contract differential.
If at the time of a buyer-breach the market price had fallen, the buyer’s liability
would be the market-contract differential. But suppose the market price
subsequently rose, and the seller resold the goods at a price greater than the
contract price. Some commentators perceive a conflict between § 708(1) and
§ 706, arguing that allowing recovery of the contract-market differential would
give the seller a windfall. The White and Summers’ treatise opts for restricting
recovery:
Whether the drafters intended a seller who has resold to recover more in
damages under 2-708(1) than he could recover under 2-706 is not clear.
We conclude that a seller should not be permitted to recover more under
2-708(1) than under 2-706, but we admit we are swimming upstream
against a heavy current of implication which flows from the comments
and the Code history.8
Some courts and other commentators have joined White and Summers in
their concern about a possible windfall. 9
6. Golden Strait Corp. v. Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory) [2007] UKHL 12,
[2007] 2 AC 353 (appeal taken from Eng.).
7. [2015] UKSC 43, [2015] 3 All ER 1082 (appeal taken from Eng.).
8. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-7 (West Publishing Co.,
Vol. 1, 6th ed. 2000).
9. See, e.g., Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 1083 (9th Cir. 1979); Tesoro Petroleum
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Consider a simple example: Widgetco promises to sell to Buildco 1,000 tons
of widgets for delivery on January 1 for $100,000. On January 1, Buildco
breaches and the market value is $70,000. Damages? $30,000. But, Buildco
argues, Widgetco did not sell right away; it held the widgets for three more years,
ultimately selling them for $120,000. Citing § 2-706, Buildco claims the resale
should be taken into account and that Widgetco did not lose $30,000 after all.
Compensating that amount would mean Widgetco would net $50,000, plus the
$30,000 remedy, plus the $20,000 increase in value, which would be a windfall.
So goes the argument.10
The widgets three years hence might well be physically identical, but they are
not economically identical. At the moment of breach, Widgetco has lost an
asset—the right to the net proceeds of sale on January 1. In this case, it happens
to be a positive amount, $30,000. The right to sell widgets on January 1 is not the
same as the right to sell physically identical widgets at some subsequent date.
Awarding Widgetco $30,000 puts it in as good a position as if the other party had
fully performed. In addition to the $30,000, it would still have the widgets, which
would be worth $30,000 less than they were when the contract was formed. Had
it in fact sold the widgets at the market price at the moment of breach, Widgetco
would be in exactly the same position as if the contract had been performed
(ignoring the costs of both finding a new buyer and litigation).
After January 1, it would be free to buy, sell, or use the widgets. The
subsequent course of prices of widgets (or any other assets) bears no relation to
what it had lost at the time of the buyer’s breach. If it held the widgets, it bore the
risk of subsequent price changes. Suppose that in the three years following
January 1, Widgetco had, at various dates, bought and sold physically identical
widgets. Buildco argues some of these transactions are cover contracts. The
prices of those transactions are as relevant to its damage award as the prices of
Widgetco stock or any other assets it might have bought or sold in that
subsequent period—namely, no relevance at all. The simple point is this: if the
market price information is easily available, the quest for the remedy should be
over. If the seller decides to hold, use, eat, or resell the item, that ought to be of
no concern to the breaching buyer.
If the market price were not so easily available, then the proceeds of resale
might come into play. Rather than treat § 2-706 as an alternative or coequal
remedy, it is more useful to view it as a possible source of evidence of the market
price at the time of the breach. The persuasiveness of the evidence from a
Corp. v. Holborn Oil Co., Ltd., 547 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); Eades Commodities, Co. v. Hoeper,
825 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. App. Ct. 1992); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Conflicting Formulas for Measuring
Expectation Damages, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369, 398–99 (2013); Jennifer S. Martin, Opportunistic Resales and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 2016 ILL. L. REV 487.
10. In Peace River Seed Co-Operative, Ltd. v. Proseeds Marketing, Inc., 322 P.3d 531, 532–34, 542, 546
(Or. 2014), the seller sold the product (grass seeds) three years after the breach. The trial court used that price to
determine damages. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, using the price at the time of the breach, much to the
consternation of one scholar, Martin, supra note 9.
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subsequent resale would depend on the temporal proximity of the substitute. If
the seller were to resell promptly that would be good evidence of the market
price and the burden should be on the buyer to show the sale price was
unreasonable. Likewise, if instead the seller had breached, the persuasiveness of
the evidence of the buyer’s subsequent transaction would depend on both the
temporal proximity and the physical similarity of the buyer’s subsequent
purchase.11
Courts struggle over whether a particular transaction should be recognized as
the cover transaction. The contract-as-asset framework suggests that this is
unnecessary. Any subsequent transactions could be evidence of the market price;
the only question ought to be whether a particular transaction would be good
evidence for the market price. Here are two representative illustrations of how
courts have made a simple question harder by looking for the cover contract.
In Jon-T Farms, Inc. v. Goodpasture, Inc.,12 the seller, Jon-T, failed to
deliver about 6 million pounds of grain. Goodpasture would buy grain from
farmers like Jon-T and store it or sell it on to users. Goodpasture’s damage claim
was for the market-contract differential at the time of the breach (§ 2-713); but
Jon-T insisted that Goodpasture had covered (§ 2-712). The court ultimately
decided for Goodpasture (as it should have) but it took a roundabout way of
getting there:
There is no evidence that in Goodpasture’s mode of operation it makes a
specific purchase contract in order to meet the requirements of a specific
sales contract. The company maintains “position” records as to its overall
operation which disclose the total amount of grain it has contracted to
sell and the total amount it has contracted to buy, and its “position” is
maintained in order to fill its sales contracts. The contract entered into
between Jon-T and Goodpasture cannot be said to have been entered into
to fill any particular outstanding commitment. The grain purchased is
commingled with other grain. Although in the overall operation
Goodpasture may have bought some grain to compensate for the
undelivered Jon-T grain to insure an adequate supply to meet its
commitments, there is no testimony that Goodpasture went out and
bought specific grain to make up for the specific amount of grain
undelivered by Jon-T. Nevertheless, Jon-T insists in its brief that
Goodpasture covered in March or April, 1974, for the Jon-T shortage;
however, we do not find any evidence of such specific purchases for
such alleged cover set out in the record.13
11. For a seller’s breach, the problem is framed as a conflict between UCC §2-713 (AM. LAW INST. &
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951) (contract/market differential or market damages) and UCC §1-305 (AM. LAW INST.
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had
fully performed).
12. 554 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
13. Id. at 750.
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Whether Goodpasture matched its orders to buy and sell was irrelevant. The
court did not find any evidence of specific purchases for cover; it should not have
been looking for that evidence. The only relevant question was whether any
subsequent transaction was good evidence of the market price at the time of the
breach.
Cargill, Inc. v. Stafford14 is an extreme example of the confusion regarding
cover. The seller repudiated a sale of wheat and the buyer, Cargill, claimed
damages based on the date at which Cargill accepted the repudiation. However,
in interpreting the § 2-713 language, “when the buyer learned of the breach,” the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that this meant time of performance (a
mistake to be discussed in Part III).
My concern here is the court’s assertion that the remedy would depend on
whether or not there was a valid reason for the buyer not covering:
If substitution is readily available and buyer does not cover within a
reasonable time, damages should be based on the price at the end of that
reasonable time rather than on the price when performance is due. If a
valid reason exists for failure or refusal to cover, damages may be
calculated from the time when performance is due.15
The court remanded, holding that:
If Cargill did not have a valid reason, the court’s award based on the
September 6 price should be reinstated. If Cargill had a valid reason for
not covering, damages should be awarded on the difference between the
price on September 30, the last day for performance, and the July 31
contract price. 16
So, depending on what had happened to the price in the interim, the parties
could argue over whether Cargill had covered, if it had, which transaction was
the cover transaction, and if not, over the validity of Cargill’s reason for not
covering.
Did Cargill cover? The court said: “The record contains scant, if any,
evidence that Cargill covered the wheat.”17 And again: “The record does not
show that Cargill covered or attempted to cover. Nothing in the record shows the
continued availability or nonavailability of substitute wheat.”18 And so the case
was remanded to determine whether Cargill had a valid reason for failing to

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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553 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1227 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1227.
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cover.19 Cargill, of course, was (and still is) a major player in a thick market. It
engages in numerous wheat transactions every day. It makes no sense to identify
any particular trade as the cover contract. So, unless the wheat market somehow
disappeared on or around September 6, substitute wheat would have been readily
available. To even ask whether Cargill covered makes no sense, and it makes
even less sense to ask whether the reason for not covering was valid or invalid.
My point in both these instances is simply that the contract-as-asset
framework makes identifying a particular transaction as the cover transaction
irrelevant. The question ought to be whether any of the transactions is helpful in
determining the market price at the time of the breach.
Tesoro Petroleum v. Holborn Oil Company20 is an apparent exception.
However, the appearance is an artifact of the seller’s misstatement of the facts.
The contract was for the sale of a cargo of 10 million gallons of gasoline at $1.30
per gallon. When the market price plummeted, the buyer breached. The seller
then sold the cargo for $1.10/gallon. The seller claimed that there was a
discrepancy between the cover price ($1.10) and the market price (allegedly 7580 cents). It argued that compensation should be based on the contract-market
differential (§ 2-708) rather than the cover price (§ 2-706). Using the market
price (§ 2-708) would have resulted in giving the seller a $3 million “windfall.”
The court, citing White and Summers with approval, concluded the appropriate
price was the cover price, not the market price. 21
What could explain the divergence between the cover and market price?
Nothing. The court conceded that:
[T]he price for which one actually sells merchandise is evidence as to its
market value, and there is no explanation as to why Esso Sapa was
willing to pay a premium of about 40% above market to obtain this
cargo, the question as to the actual market value is not raised for
determination on this motion.22
We could envision a situation in which a naïve buyer is unaware of market
alternatives, and a clever seller takes advantage of that naiveté by assessing an
above-market price. But that is hardly plausible in the world inhabited by
sophisticated oil traders. The cover transaction, according to the seller, was
heavily negotiated: “After unsuccessfully attempting to convince (defendant) to
honor its contract, (plaintiff) scrambled to find a new buyer and, on July 17, after
feverish, lengthy and deliberate negotiations, concluded a sale to Esso Sapa.”23
The July 17 date is the only date mentioned in the opinion. That suggests one

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
547 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
Id. at 1016–17.
Id. at 1013.
Id. at 1016.
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possible—albeit unlikely—explanation for the discrepancy. Conceivably, the
breach took place weeks earlier and by July 17 the market had bounced back. If
that were true, then the seller should have been compensated on the basis of the
market price at the time of the breach. In the more plausible situation in which
the “cover transaction” took place close to the moment of breach, the cover
transaction would have been good evidence of the market price. The outcome
would have been correct, but the reasoning would have been wrong.
II. AVAILABLE MARKET
In England, if a buyer were to breach by failing to accept goods, the Sale of
Goods Act holds that “where there is an available market for the goods in
question the measure of damages is prima facie to be ascertained by the
difference between the contract price and the market or current, price at the time
or times when the goods ought to have been accepted.”24 The same applies if the
seller were to fail to deliver. 25 That formulation raises three questions: What is
meant by available market? What should happen if there were one? And what
should happen if the court should conclude that there were none? The courts
exert a considerable amount of effort in determining whether an available market
exists. This, I suggest, is unhelpful at best.
In effect, the judges are asking whether the non-breacher mitigated or could
reasonably have mitigated. If identical goods were available to the buyer at the
time of the breach, the buyer could mitigate, if it chose to do so, and the damages
would reflect the changed market conditions. This is the idealized available
market. As we move away from this idealized form—substitutes are not
identical, replacement would not be instantaneous—at some point the courts
could conclude there was not an available market. But that focuses on the wrong
question. As in the previous section, the relevant question should be: what are the
direct damages (the change in the value of the contract)? A subsequent
transaction (cover) would be possible evidence of the damages.
After reviewing the case law, I want to make four points. First, there is great
confusion about what constitutes an available market. Second, in a number of
instances, determination of the existence of an available market is irrelevant.
After going through the exercise of determining whether an available market
existed, the judge concluded the damages were the same regardless. Third, in
other instances the damage remedy did depend on the characterization: the
market differential if the judge found an available market and lost profits (or
something else) if it did not. Fourth, in some instances, the question was not the
measurement of direct damages but rather of consequential damages.
The modern discussion of the available market concept got off to a bad start
in the mid-1950’s with two decisions regarding a buyer’s breach of its contract to
24. Sale of Goods Act 1979, C. 54, § 50(3) (Eng.).
25. Id. at § 51(3).
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buy a new automobile. At that time, cars were sold under resale price
maintenance (rpm), a factor the courts deemed relevant. In the first, Thompson
(W. L.) Ltd. v. Robinson (Gunmakers) Ltd,26 Upjohn J noted:
It is curious that there is a comparative absence of authority on the
meaning of the phrase ‘available market,’ because one would have
thought that there would have been many cases, but the researches of
counsel have only disclosed one authority on section 50 (3). It is Dunkirk
Colliery Co. v. Lever.27
In Dunkirk, an 1878 decision, the court seemed to assert that an available
market would be a physical place where buyers and sellers might meet—like the
Corn Exchange or cotton market in Liverpool. Upjohn J conceded there was
“nothing in the nature of a market like a Cotton Exchange or Baltic or Stock
Exchange, or anything of the sort, for the sale of new motor-cars.”28 He
considered that definition to be binding on him in interpreting § 50(3), but
concluded that it did not matter since he would have reached the same conclusion
whether or not he found that an available market existed. He noted that § 50(3)
was only a prima facie rule, so that even if he had found an available market, it
would be unjust to measure damages as the difference between the contract and
market price (zero because of the rpm). Instead, he held that the damages were
the difference between the wholesale and retail price—the lost profits.
In the second case concerning the sale of a new car, Charter v. Sullivan,29
Jenkins J found neither Dunkirk nor Thompson entirely satisfactory. He
concluded that an available market would require a possible difference between
the contract and market price:
The language of section 50 (3) seems to me to postulate that in the cases
to which it applies there will, or may, be a difference between the
contract price and the market or current price, which cannot be so where
the goods can only be sold at a fixed retail price. 30
Therefore, he concluded, there was no available market. Unlike Thompson,
the Charter court found only nominal damages. I have written elsewhere why the
analysis in both decisions is flawed, but I need not go into that here. 31 For present
purposes, I note that when the commentators confront the question of the
existence of an available market, they often begin with these cases (despite the

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

[1955] 1 Ch 177.
Id. at 158 (citing Dunkirk Colliery Co. v Lever (1878) 9 Ch. D. 20).
Id. at 158–59.
[1957] 2 QB 117.
Id. at 128.
See GOLDBERG, RETHINKING THE LAW OF CONTRACT DAMAGES, supra note 3, at 100–41.
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fact that they are nonsensical).32
A generation later, the issue arose in The Elena D’Amico.33 About halfway
through a three-year charter, the ship owner refused to make repairs, thereby
repudiating the charter. The charterer could have replaced this charter with
another one but chose not to do so. Robert Goff J held there was an available
market for replacement charters and there were two implications. First, the direct
damages would be the difference between the charter (or contract) price and the
market price at the time of the breach. This was true regardless of whether the
aggrieved party entered into a substitute transaction. Second, the charterer argued
that it had suffered consequential damages—lost profits as a result of the
repudiation. If a substitute were not available, then these consequential damages
might be recoverable. However, since the judge had found that there was an
available market, the charterer could have entered into a substitute charter, and
any lost profits from its failure to do so would have been the fault of the
charterer, not the owner. The charterer could have rechartered and avoided the
loss, but, for whatever reason, chose not to do so.
In Shearson Lehman Hutton v. Maclaine Watson,34 the issue was one of
timing. The buyer (Maclaine) failed to perform a contract to take over 7,000
metric tons of tin for about £70 million. Webster J, devoted a considerable
amount of his opinion to a review of Dunkirk Colliery Co v. Lever, W L
Thompson Ltd v R Robinson (Gunmakers) Ltd, and Charter v. Sullivan, finally
concluding there was an available market. He cited an argument in Charter v.
Sullivan that there was no available market because the resale of the car had
taken seven to ten days. Webster J noted that Benjamin’s Sale of Goods35 had
rejected this argument: “It is submitted that the temporal test should be one of a
reasonable time after the breach, given the nature of the goods in question and
the business situation of the plaintiff; and that the opinion of Sellers L.J. is wrong
on this point.”36 Webster J would not go this far: “I would not, even if it was
open to me, conclude that the conclusion of Sellers LJ, that there was no
available market because there was no available buyer (at all) until some seven to
ten days after the breach, was wrong.”37
Webster J then proposed his own definition:
[I]f the seller actually offers the goods for sale there is no available
market unless there is one actual buyer on that day at a fair price; that if
there is no actual offer for sale, but only a notional or hypothetical sale
for the purposes of s 50(3), there is no available market unless on that
32. See MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES ¶ 25-118-120 (James Edelman et al. eds., 20th ed. 2019).
33. Koch Marine Inc v. d’Amica Societa di Navigazione arl (The Elena D’Amico) [1980] 1 Ll Rep 75.
34. [1990] 3 All ER 723.
35. BENJAMIN’S SALE OF GOODS ¶ 1294 (The Common Law Library Vol. 11, Sweet & Maxwell) (3rd
ed. 1987).
36. I don’t believe Sellers said any such thing.
37. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 3 All ER, at 730.
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day there are in the market sufficient traders potentially in touch with
each other to evidence a market in which the actual or notional seller
could if he wished sell the goods.38
In implementing this, he asserted this would entail “a hypothetical sale by a
hypothetical seller of the amount in question of the goods in question.” 39 The
seller (Shearson) argued this would require sale of the entire amount on the due
date. That would have meant finding the price a buyer would pay for the entire
quantity on the date of the breach; given the large quantity, it would most likely
not be feasible for the seller to move that entire quantity on that day. Recognizing
this, Webster J held the fair market price would take into account the price that
might have been negotiated a few days before and after the breach. He assumed
that the hypothetical seller of the goods in question, knowing that he
would have to make the sale on that day, had begun to negotiate it
sufficiently far ahead to enable him to make contact with all potential
buyers so as to achieve a sale, on that day, at a fair market price for that
day. Neither of these assumptions, if they have to be made, seems to me
to be inconsistent with the objects of the subsection or with the
application.40
In effect, this means that by implementing the available market concept in
this way, he was rejecting Sellers LJ focus on the sale on the day of the breach
and accepting Benjamin’s. In practice, it meant the market price would be higher
than Shearson’s proposed standard—sale of the entire quantity on the day of the
breach. The market price would not be a fire-sale price but would reflect overall
market conditions at the time of the breach. 41 It also meant the available market
notion was irrelevant. If he had concluded that there was no available market, he
could have looked at market conditions immediately before and after the breach
and come to the same conclusion. Determining the market price if the transaction
was for a small amount of the goods in a thick market is fairly easy. The less
frequent the transactions and the larger the contract amount, the more likely it is
that ascertaining the market price would require looking at a longer time period.
The reasonable-period-of-time was stretched further in Aercap Partners 1
Limited v. Avia Asset Management AB.42 Avia entered into a contract to buy two
airplanes for delivery in May and November 2009. The buyer repudiated in
January 2009 and the seller finally resold the planes in February 2010. The buyer
argued that § 50(3) applied and that there was an available market in May and
38. Id.
39. Id. at 726.
40. Id. at 731.
41. Shearson Lehman Hutton v. Maclaine Watson [1990] 3 All ER 723 (Eng.) (citing Garnac Grain Co.
v. HMF Faure & Fairclough [1968] AC 1130 (Eng.) to support this proposition).
42. [2010] EWHC 2431, ¶ 6–11 (Comm).
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November 2009. In the interim, prices continued falling; the difference between
November 2009 and February 2010 prices being over $3 million. Gross LJ held
there was sufficient evidence of Aercap’s inability to sell the planes at the earlier
date and, therefore, there was no available market. In the alternative, he held that
had he concluded that there were an available market, under § 50(3) the seller
was entitled to a reasonable period of time to go into the market and that the
reasonable time period had not expired prior to the February 2010 sale. He did
not explain how there could have been known market prices in 2009, but that the
seller could not somehow access that market.
Assuming that he was correct in this, then the actual resale price in February
2010 was, Gross LJ believed, the best evidence of the market price at the time of
the breach.43 Two points should be highlighted. First, the result did not depend on
whether or not the court found the existence of an available market; the damage
measure was the same regardless. Second, if he had concluded that there was an
available market, that would be a significant deviation from Webster’s definition
in Shearson: “on that day there are in the market sufficient traders potentially in
touch with each other to evidence a market in which the actual or notional seller
could if he wished sell the goods.”44 The year between repudiation and the
substitute transaction does not meet that standard.
Could there be an available market if the goods were customized? That
question arose in M&J Marine Engineering Services Co Ltd v. Shipshore
Limited.45 It was further complicated by the fact that the buyer was acting as a
middleman. M&J, the breaching seller, entered into a contract with Shipshore
(SS) to produce 1032 machine rollers at a price of $175 per unit; the rollers were
customized products. SS was acting as a middleman and entered into a separate
contract with Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard (ASRY). M&J did not deliver;
Field J held that there had been a contract and that M&J had breached it. SS
found a substitute supplier for about $300 per unit and successfully renegotiated
its contract with ASRY at the $300 price. SS argued the substitute goods were
acquired in an available market; therefore, the damages were the difference
between the contract and substitute price, roughly $125 per unit (about $140,000
total). In the alternative, SS argued it should get its “lost profit” on the ASRY
contract, about $23,000.
Field J held “an ‘available market’ involves a reasonably available supply of
the contract goods and a reasonably available source of demand for such goods,
and there was no such market for the goods to be supplied by M&J.” 46 Because
the goods were customized, he concluded there was not an available market, even
though SS found someone who could (and did) supply the goods. What would be

43. I would argue that the relevant price should have been the forward price in January 2009 for the
deliveries in May and November. I would doubt that the February 2010 price was evidence of this.
44. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 3 All ER at 730.
45. [2009] EWHC 2031 (Comm).
46. Id. at ¶ 30.
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the damages if there were not an available market? Field J held they would be the
expected “lost profits”; if both parties had performed, it would have netted the
difference between the price it bought from M&J and sold to ASRY. He then
made some minor adjustments. So, unlike Shearson and Aercap, the outcome did
depend on whether or not the court had found an available market.
But if SS had not successfully renegotiated the ASRY contract, SS would
have been liable to ASRY for the market differential. SS would have suffered a
loss on its M&J contract of the same contract-market differential ($140,000) as
SS argued it would have received had the court concluded that there was an
available market. The difference between the two outcomes did not depend on
the available market issue; rather, it was a byproduct of the court linking two
independent contracts. If SS had been merely a broker, ASRY could have sued
M&J directly for the contract-market differential. But SS was a principal in two
separate contracts in which it bore counterparty risk. Its ability to renegotiate one
of the contracts should have had no bearing on the damage remedy in the other.47
In Air Studios (Lyndhurst) Limited T/A Air Entertainment Group v. Lombard
North Central PLC,48 the seller promised to deliver some used equipment used in
film and television post-production for £100,000. After concluding the parties
had made a contract and the seller had breached, Males J considered the damage
question. He posed the question by asking first whether there was an available
market:
The first question to be determined is whether there was an available
market for the goods in question. That contains within it two sub-issues.
First, it is necessary to ascertain what is meant by ‘the goods in question’
in the context of this case. Second, the question is whether there was ‘an
available market’ for those goods.49
The buyer argued that the “goods in question” referred to new equipment and
that the cost of new equipment would be about £500,000. Males J concluded,
however, “that the availability of equivalent second-hand goods capable of
performing the same functions in much the same way would constitute an
available market for ‘the goods in question’. A buyer of such equivalent goods
would be in the same financial position as if the contract had been performed.”50
Males J then asked whether there was an available market for the secondhand goods. Was there a ready availability of willing sellers and a reasonable
degree of flexibility regarding the timing of delivery?

47. I have examined the question elsewhere; see GOLDBERG, RETHINKING THE LAW OF CONTRACT
DAMAGES, supra note 3, at 100–41.
48. [2012] EWHC 3162 (QB).
49. Id. at ¶ 91.
50. Id. at ¶ 93.
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It is . . . of the essence of an “available market” that it should in fact be
available to the innocent party so that the innocent party, who needs to
decide what to do, can be confident that the goods it needs will be
available for purchase within a reasonable time. Accordingly when the
purchase of equivalent second-hand equipment is possible, but the supply
is limited and likely to be possible only after a period of delay, it is a
question of degree whether such availability is sufficient to satisfy the
requirement for an available market. 51
In fact, after the breach the buyer no longer had a need for the equipment,
but, as Males J acknowledged, that was not relevant. He did conclude:
[Although a system] would have been sourceable within a matter of
about three months with the assistance of specialist dealers or brokers,
. . . this falls short of constituting an available market. . . . A delay of
several months after which it was probable, but no more than that, that
suitable equivalent replacement equipment could be located for purchase
does not amount to a reasonably available supply of the goods in
question.52
Instead of § 51(3), therefore, Males J had to use § 51(2). He could use the
value of the goods or the lost profits because the goods were not delivered. The
plaintiff, having lost its argument for the price of new goods, argued for the lost
profits, but the judge rejected that asserting the plaintiff had not established that
its use of the goods would have been profitable. Instead he held: “I consider that
the award of damages by reference to the cost of replacement secondhand
equipment would compensate Air Studios for the estimated loss directly and
naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from Lombard’s breach.”53
He then noted:
I would add that if I am wrong in my conclusion above that there was no
available market for the equipment in question, so that in truth there was
an available market for equivalent second-hand equipment, the measure
of damages pursuant to section 51(3) would be the same as I have found
it to be pursuant to section 51(2). It is not surprising that the application
of the two sub-sections produces the same result as each sub-section
reflects the same principle. On the contrary, it would be surprising if the
result was very different according to which sub-section is in play.54
In essence, Males J admits that the whole question of the existence of an
51.
52.
53.
54.
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available market was irrelevant. The question that he did answer, even if he did
not frame it this way, was the value of the asset—the contract—at the time of the
breach. Determining that value is not so easy when the contract concerns secondhand goods, especially when the goods are a group of different items supplied by
different firms. But that problem is independent of whether or not the goods are
treated as being in an available market.
In Coastal (Bermuda) Petroleum Ltd v. Vtt Vulcan Petroleum SA (‘The
Marine Star’),55 the available market question again concerned the timing of a
substitute transaction. However, it did not concern the contract/market
differential; rather, it involved a claim for consequential damages. The decision
was complicated by the fact that the buyer (Coastal Bermuda) was selling backto-back to an affiliated company (Coastal Aruba). Thus, as in M&J Marine, the
buyer was a middleman, acting as a principal in two separate contracts: VulcanCoastal Bermuda (V-CB) and Coastal Bermuda-Coastal Aruba (CB-CA). Vulcan
was an oil trader and both Coastal entities were part of a larger group engaged in
refining. Both contracts called for the delivery of a specific type of oil (Russian
E-4) in a specific time frame—i.e., August 4–10, 1991. Vulcan repudiated on
August 2, and CA bought a replacement cargo of a different oil (M-100). The
price in the V-CB contract was indexed to the price of West Texas International
as quoted on the NY Mercantile Exchange (Nymex) for September oil futures—
the average closing price over August 5–9 minus US $6.25 per barrel. The price
in the CB-CA contract was the same indexed price minus $6.00. Liability had
already been determined so that the only issue was assessing damages.
If the direct damages were to be reckoned only by the contract/market
differential, then they would be zero. But it was a thin market and if the buyer
had to procure E-4 within the time frame, the buyer would have had to pay a
considerable premium, if indeed it could obtain any within that time period.
Mance J. found that “a replacement cargo would be unlikely to be found afloat at
such short notice,”56 and it was, therefore, reasonable to consider the imperfect
substitute, M-100. The damage claims were under two heads: CB’s loss of profit
of 25 cents on its contract with CA; and the “loss of yield”—i.e., the difference
between the E-4 and M-100 oil.
The available market issue arose with regard to the loss of profit claim. If CB
could have acquired E-4 before the delivery period expired, there would be no
lost profits—it would have made its 25 cents on the replacement E-4. However,
if it could not obtain E-4, Vulcan would, held Mance J, be liable for those lost
profits: “The lack of an available market may result not from any particular
intervening event, but from a combination of market forces, a tight contractual
delivery date and a late repudiation by the defendants leading to a situation in
which no replacement goods are available.” 57 Mance J then concluded that since
55. [1994] C.L.C. 1019.
56. Id. at 1025.
57. Id.
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the parties, V and CB, contemplated that CB would make a profit on its sale to
CA, the 25 cents per barrel would be recoverable. Four points: (1) this would not
be direct damages, it would be consequential damages; (2) if CB were merely a
broker, CA would have had a direct claim against V, but since CB was a
counterparty to two independent contracts it would have had a claim against V
and CA would have had a claim against CB; (3) if CB had been merely a broker,
CA would have been able to sue V directly; and (4) Coastal structured its
business to keep the units independent for business reasons; it seems dubious
policy to allow it to treat the units as dependent for this one purpose.
The loss of yield claim had two components, although Mance J failed to
recognize this. The first component would be based on the difference between
the market price of E-4 and M-100. The market treated the two as roughly
equivalent: “E-4 and M-100 traded on the market at about the same price with M100, if anything, at a higher price.” 58 However, E-4 was better suited to the
unique features of the Aruba refinery, so the value of E-4 to CA was greater than
the value of M-100. Mance J found the difference to be thirty cents per barrel. If
this were a direct contract between V and CA, a good argument could be made
for allowing recovery of these damages. The buyer could argue the goods were to
be fit for a particular purpose. The argument is weaker when, as in this case, CA
is not in privity with V if the V-CB contract did not spell out that particular
purpose.
In Fulton Shipping Inc of Panama v. Globalia Business Travel S.A.U. (The
New Flamenco),59 the charterer and owner of the New Flamenco, a small cruise
ship, were negotiating an extension of the charter period and reached an oral
agreement for a two-year extension. The charterer refused to sign and maintained
that it could redeliver on the preexisting termination date. The owner disagreed,
arguing that an agreement existed, and the charterer had anticipatorily repudiated
that agreement. The arbitrator found in favor of the owner on the liability
question. The problem arose in assessing damages. The owner claimed that it
would have earned €7,558,375 had the charter been performed for the two years.
Shortly after the repudiation, the New Flamenco was sold for $23,765,000. Less
than a year later, Lehman Brothers imploded, and the market for ships collapsed.
The arbitrator found that by November 2009 (the end date for the contract
extension), the ship’s market value had fallen to $7 million.
The question confronting the arbitrator, and the subsequent justices, was:
how, if at all, should the fall in value of the ship be taken into account in
determining damages? The charterer argued the breach caused the sale, and the
sale mitigated the damages. In effect, it suggested that by breaching it did the
owner a favor; by causing him to sell before the market crash, the owner saved

58. Id. at 1031.
59. Fulton Shipping Inc. of Panama v. Globalia Bus. Travel S.A.U. (The New Flamenco) [2015] EWCA
(Civ) 1299; Fulton Shipping Inc. of Panama v. Globalia Bus. Travel S.A.U. (The New Flamenco) [2017] UKSC
43.
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over $16 million. The arbitrator agreed. Because that saving was so much greater
than the foregone earnings, he awarded nothing to the owner. In the High Court,
Popplewell J rejected the arbitrator’s conclusion; he, in turn, was reversed by the
Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court reversed again, rejecting the argument that
the sale of the vessel mitigated the damages.
All the judges, invoking The Elena D’Amico, agreed that if there were an
“available market,” the damage measure would be the difference between the
market rate and the charter rate. If there were an available market and the owner
chose not to recharter, liability would still be based on the market rate. A failure
to do so would not constitute a failure to mitigate since the losses would be the
result of an independent decision not to recharter. In the Court of Appeal,
Longmore J said:
An important question in this area of the law is whether there is an
available market. . . . A decision to speculate on the market rather than
buying in (or selling) at the date of the breach did not ‘arise’ from the
contract but from the innocent party’s decision not to avail himself of the
available market. 60
But what if, as the arbitrator concluded, there were not an “available
market”? Rather than recognizing that the decision to sell was independent of the
breach, Longmore J argued that the sale of the vessel mitigated damages. He
concluded the results for the available market did not hold if no such market were
available:
[T]he prima facie measure of loss in hire contracts is the difference
between the contractual hire and the cost of earning that hire (crew
wages, cost of fuel etc.). But it will not usually be reasonable for the
shipowner to claim that prima facie measure if he is able to mitigate that
loss by trading his vessel if opportunities to trade that vessel arise. If he
does so trade the vessel, he may make additional losses or additional
profits but, in either event, they should be taken into account.61
The Supreme Court concluded that the breach did not cause the sale of the
vessel, and, therefore, that the sale did not mitigate the damages:
The repudiation resulted in a prospective loss of income for a period of
about two years. Yet, there was nothing about the premature termination
of the charterparty which made it necessary to sell the vessel, either at all
or at any particular time. Indeed, it could have been sold during the term
of the charterparty. If the owners decide to sell the vessel, whether before

60. The New Flamenco [2015] EWCA (Civ) 1299, at ¶ 24.
61. Id. at ¶ 25.
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or after termination of the charterparty, they are making a commercial
decision at their own risk about the disposal of an interest in the vessel
which was no part of the subject matter of the charterparty and had
nothing to do with the charterers. 62
The relevant concern, it argued, was the difference between the projected
income streams with and without the charter. That was unaffected by the sale of
the vessel. The Supreme Court said:
In the absence of an available market, the measure of the loss is the
difference between the contract rate and what was or ought reasonably to
have been earned from employment of the vessel under shorter
charterparties, as for example on the spot market. The relevant mitigation
in that context is the acquisition of an income stream alternative to the
income stream under the original charterparty. The sale of the vessel was
not itself an act of mitigation because it was incapable of mitigating the
loss of the income stream. 63
In fact, the mitigation took a different form. The owner did not enter into
shorter charters on the spot market. Rather, it sold the vessel to a new owner
who, apparently, did not charter the vessel to others; instead, it used the vessel
for its own purposes. Conceptually, the purchase price could be broken down into
two pieces—the first two years (the charter period) and the rest of the vessel’s
expected life. If the buyer expected to immediately replace the charter at the
current market rate (perhaps because the new owner planned to use the vessel
immediately itself), then the price would reflect that. That piece would have been
valuable to the buyer and that value would have been captured in the sale price.
The value of the vessel would have been about the same with or without the
charter, and damages would have been close to zero. At the other extreme, if the
new owner had anticipated that the ship would remain idle for the full two years,
it would have paid nothing for the first piece. The relevant question then
becomes: what would have been the expected period of time the vessel would
remain idle? Unfortunately, none of the judges considered whether the owner
could or did use the vessel in the two-year period.
The arbitrator found that had the vessel remained idle for the entire two
years, the damages would have been €7,558,375. Multiplying that number by the
fraction of time the vessel was expected to remain idle would provide a good
approximation of the owner’s damages. If, as is plausible, the expected period of
idleness were considerably less than two years, the damages would be reduced
accordingly. Whether that approach would give a better picture of the damages
than the rates for shorter charter parties on the spot market should have been the
62. The New Flamenco [2017] UKSC 43, at ¶ 32.
63. Id. at ¶ 34.
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relevant question. What happened to the vessel after the owner sold the vessel—
whether the shipping market changed, the ship sank, or it was resold—would be
irrelevant.
The upshot of this review of the case law is that courts should not waste their
time arguing about the existence of an available market. If the plaintiff were to
argue that it suffered consequential damages because of the seller’s failure to
deliver (as in the Elena D’Amico), then the question is whether the plaintiff could
have entered into an alternative transaction that would have avoided those
consequences. For assessing direct damages, the relevant concern is the change
in the value of the contract at the time of the breach. For a thick market—like for
cotton or grain—that is straightforward. As we move away from that extreme, the
measurement problems become more difficult. But labeling the problem as one
of whether there existed an available market does nothing to resolve the question.
III. ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION
Following an anticipatory breach, there is a temporal gap between acceptance
of that breach and final disposition of the case. The damage remedy should be
reckoned at the point the repudiation was accepted, or should have been
accepted. If the court’s decision would be made after the date performance was
due, this just adds two wrinkles to the analysis of the simple breach problem of
Part I. If, however, performance were supposed to continue beyond the decision
date, the problem becomes more complicated. The contract-as-asset framework
should play a larger role. Section A considers the first problem; Section B
considers the second.
A. Performance Due Before Decision
Suppose that a contract calls for delivery of 1,000 widgets on December 1 at
a price of $1.00 per widget, but the seller repudiates (and the repudiation is
accepted) on June 1. If the court were to decide the case after December 1, the
court would have access to all post-repudiation information. Some courts and
commentators argue that damage assessment should take into account that postrepudiation evidence, and, therefore, the assessment should be made using the
market price at the time of performance (December 1). 64 Recall the discussion of
Cargill, Inc. v. Stafford in Part I. The question there, like here, was whether the
damages should be measured at the time the repudiation was accepted or at the
date at which performance was to take place. The court made the answer depend

64. See, e.g., Hess Energy, Inc. v. Lightning Oil Co., 338 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir. 2003). The White &
Summers treatise enthusiastically endorses that view. WHITE & SUMMERS, U.C.C., supra note 8, at § 7-7.
Commenting on that decision, the treatise states: “In affirming Hess’ jury verdict . . . the Fourth Circuit agrees
with our interpretation and arguments . . . for the proposition that 2-713 measures the contract market difference
at the time of delivery not at time of repudiation in a repudiation case. Hurray for Judge Niemeyer.” (§7.6)
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on a nonsensical question—whether Cargill had covered and, if not, whether it
had a valid reason for not covering. Since Cargill engages in frequent wheat
transactions it made no sense to attempt to identify a particular one as a cover
transaction.
The contract-as-asset approach suggests that the change in the value of the
asset occurred at the time the repudiation was accepted (June 1). But what price
on June 1? Is it the current price of widgets? Economically, a June 1 widget is
different from a December 1 widget. Ideally, we would want to find the June 1
price of widgets for delivery on December 1. That is, the appropriate price is not
the spot price, but the forward price. Professor Jackson argued decades ago that
“contract law presumptively should adopt a general rule that an aggrieved buyer
should cover at the forward price as of the date of the repudiation.”65 He used
Oloffson v. Coomer66 to illustrate his argument.
I agree with Professor Jackson that this would be the appropriate default rule.
However, a closer look at Oloffson suggests a bit of caution is in order. A farmer
(Coomer) promised in April to sell 40,000 bushels of corn to a grain dealer for
delivery in October and December. However, in June, Coomer informed
Oloffson he would not be planting any corn because the season had been too wet.
The contract price was about $1.12 per bushel, and the price for future delivery at
that time was $1.16 per bushel. Oloffson ultimately purchased corn at much
higher prices after the delivery dates had passed ($1.35 and $1.49) and argued
that its damages should be based on those prices. The court found that, given the
nature of the market, a commercially reasonable time to await performance was
less than a day. The court affirmed the trial court’s use of the forward price at the
time of repudiation ($1.16) when calculating damages.
Why my caution? The court noted that Oloffson had argued that he “adhered
to a usage of trade that permitted his customers to cancel the contract for a future
delivery of grain by making known to him a desire to cancel and paying to him
the difference between the contract and market price on the day of
cancellation.”67 That is, damages would be based on the spot price. But because
Coomer had failed to give notice, Oloffson argued that Coomer could not take
advantage of the rule and therefore that damages should be measured by the price
at the dates of performance ($1.35 and $1.49). The court rejected this argument,
not because it was a non sequitur (which it was), but because, it claimed, Coomer
did not know of the alleged usage, and good faith required that Oloffson inform
him of that usage.68
65. Thomas H. Jackson, “Anticipatory Repudiation” and the Temporal Element of Contract Law: An
Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of Prospective Nonperformance, 31 STAN. L. REV. 69, 94
(1978).
66. 296 N.E.2d 871 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
67. Id. at 875 (emphasis added).
68. Remarkably, White & Summers get this completely wrong. WHITE & SUMMERS, U.C.C., supra note
8, at § 7-3. Their preference was for time of performance. They reluctantly concede that “[t]he outcome of the
case can be defended only on the ground that the contract was implicitly modified by the trade usage that
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To call this a trade usage is an understatement. The rule today is, no doubt,
the same or similar to what it was when Oloffson was decided: “cancel the
defaulted portion of the contract at fair market value based on the close of the
market the next business day.”69 So, it appears that the standard rule in the grain
trade (when courts are willing to recognize it) is to use the spot price, not the
forward price. This does not mean that Professor Jackson and I are wrong to
prefer use of the forward price at the time of the repudiation as the default rule.
Determination of the spot price in many markets might be a lot easier than
determining the forward price. That was most likely true in the next case to be
discussed.
In Cosden Oil & Chemical Co. v. Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft,70 Cosden
(a producer of polystyrene) promised to deliver the product over a period of time
to Helm (a trader). Cosden delivered some, but because of production problems,
it cancelled the remaining orders. The jury found that Cosden had anticipatorily
repudiated and awarded Helm damages based on the difference between the
contract price and the market price at a commercially reasonable time after
Cosden repudiated. The court used the spot price—there was no discussion of
using the forward price instead. Polystyrene prices had risen between the time of
the repudiation and the date of performance. Helm, being a trader, engaged in a
number of transactions in the period between the repudiation and the decision.
Each party claimed that specific purchases by Helm in that period were cover
transactions—Helm choosing those close to the performance date (the higher
price) and Cosden those closer to the repudiation date. The jury concluded that
none were for cover; the court, treating this as a fact question, upheld the finding.
It is not surprising that the parties would identify the cover contracts that were
most favorable to them. What is unfortunate is that this would be treated as a fact
question. Helms, like Cargill, was a trader entering into numerous transactions;
none should be treated as the cover transaction. The only question should have
been whether any of them provided good evidence of the price at the time of the
repudiation.
I do not mean to underestimate the difficulty in determining the damages.
Problems existed even in the fairly thick markets I have discussed here and in
Part I. And if the market were thin, there would be further difficulties. In Laredo
Hides Co., Inc. v. H & H Meat Products Co., Inc.,71 for example, the contract
was a nine-month, variable output contract for all the hides H&H produced as a
byproduct of its meatpacking business. The court found the seller had repudiated.
Laredo claimed that because hides decomposed with age, it had to take the hides
prevailed in the corn market.” (§ 7-3) But, as noted, the court rejected the trade usage (spot price) and chose
instead the forward price. White & Summers’ preferred outcome, price at the time of performance, was not even
in the running.
69.
NAT’L GRAIN & FEED ASS’N, NGFA GRAIN TRADE RULES 28(A)(3) (2017),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kI5npZOLrKeijuGY76qD9I1hBBkNxJso/view.
70. 736 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1984).
71. 513 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
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on a month-to-month basis. To determine the damages, the court used the actual
hide production of H&H in each month and applied the then-current market
price. Although that required looking at post-repudiation data, it might have been
a reasonable method for determining the change in the value of the contract. The
complexity is ratcheted up when dealing with long-term agreements, the subject
of Section B.
B. Long-Term Contract
If a buyer were to repudiate a twenty-year contract in year three, how should
damages be reckoned? Often neither the price nor the quantity is fixed. The price
might be indexed or subject to renegotiation. The buyer (in a requirements
contract) or seller (in an output contract) may determine the quantity to be
supplied. The contract might include a take-or-pay or minimum quantity clause,
and that might be modified with a makeup clause. The agreement might even
include a gross inequity (or hardship) clause that would allow a disgruntled party
to appeal to an arbitrator or court to reset the price. The contract might have a
mechanism that would allow one of the parties to terminate the agreement under
certain circumstances.
“The drafters of the 1950s probably did not contemplate 20 or 30 year
contracts,” says White and Summers, “but they clearly contemplated contracts
where performance would occur after the time for trial. Section 2-723 is designed
to deal with at least one issue in such cases. It instructs the court to base damages
on the ‘market price’ at the date that the aggrieved party learns of the
repudiation.”72 Section 2-723 provides no coherent answer to the question of how
(or even if) future quantities should be determined. It ignores significant features
of the contracts such as early termination rights and price redetermination rights.
The decisions tend to focus on the price of the product—the difference between
the contract and market price. There are obvious complications for determining
each since both the price and quantity will typically not be fixed for the life of the
contract. Even if that problem could somehow be resolved, it still puts the focus
on the wrong question. The concern should not be with the change in the price of
the product, but with the change in the value of the asset—the contract—at the
time of the repudiation. The contract’s value encompasses all the nuances that the
§ 2-723 inquiry fails to reach.
The damages if the buyer were to repudiate should be the change in value of
the contract at the moment of repudiation—the present value of the difference in
the expected cash flows. If the expected future unit costs of production exceeded
the expected prices, then the seller should shut the project down. Its loss would
be the expected future revenues less the expected cost of producing that
revenue—lost profit. So, for example, when the buyer (NIPSCO) repudiated a

72. WHITE & SUMMERS, U.C.C., supra note 8, at § 7-8.

66

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52
long-term coal purchase contract with Carbon County, Judge Posner found:
The loss to Carbon County from the breach of contract is simply the
difference between (1) the contract price (as escalated over the life of the
contract in accordance with the contract’s escalator provisions) times
quantity, and (2) the cost of mining the coal over the life of the
contract.73
If, however, the producer expected to continue production through the life of
the contract, the damages—the change in the value of the contract—would be the
difference between the expected future revenues at the time when the contract
was repudiated and the expected future revenues given the new market
conditions. Projecting those two streams would clearly be a difficult task.
Nonetheless, it can be done. Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg.,
Inc.74 provides an illustration, but also suggests how imperfect the process can
be.
In November 2000, American Electric Power Company (AEP) entered into a
Power Purchase and Sale Agreement (PPSA) with Tractebel Energy Marketing,
Inc. (TEMI). AEP would build a cogeneration plant that would supply steam to
Dow Chemical and electric power to TEMI. The PPSA term was for 20 years.
Because Dow needed large quantities of steam, and because the steam and
electricity were jointly produced, the contract required that TEMI take a
substantial amount of electricity. The contract included a “must-take” provision.
AEP spent about $500 million building the facility; before the facility was on
line, the market for electricity collapsed and TEMI repudiated.
Each side provided expert testimony on AEP’s lost profits. AEP’s witness
concluded that the present value of its losses over the twenty-year period was
between $417 and $604 million with the most likely case being $520 million.
TEMI’s expert claimed that AEP suffered no loss which, given the collapse of
the electricity market, was implausible. The trial judge was not impressed by
either expert: “I found both experts provided unreliable testimony and worse yet,
it appeared to be clouded by their obvious advocacy, to paraphrase a popular
show tune, on behalf of the lady they came in with.”75 But even if they had done
impeccable work, he would not have accepted it; it would have been too
speculative:
In order to know what AEP’s revenues would be over the next twenty
years, one would have to be able to presage a vast and varied body of
73. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. (NIPSCO) v. Carbon Cty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 279 (7th Cir. 1986). The
contract had a price adjustment clause and was for a fixed quantity per year.
74. Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc. (Tractebel II), 487 F.3d 89, 109 (2d Cir.
2007).
75. Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc. (Tractebel I), No. 03 Civ. 6731(HB), 03 Civ.
6770(HB), 2005 WL 1863853, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2005).
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facts. Any projection of lost profits would necessarily include
assumptions regarding the price of electricity and the costs of operating
over twenty years. One would also need to surmise what competing
forms of energy such as coal and nuclear energy would cost over the
same time period. Also factoring into this calculation are the political and
regulatory developments over twenty years, population growth in the
Entergy region, and technological advances affecting the production of
power and related products. With so many unknown variables, these
experts might have done as well had they consulted tealeaves or a crystal
ball.76
So, he concluded, the lost profits damages were too speculative and, hence,
were zero. The Court of Appeals disagreed: “The variables identified by the
district court exist in every long-term contract. It is not the case that all such
contracts may be breached with impunity because of the difficulty of accurately
calculating damages.”77 The decision does not indicate how either expert
determined the future prices or quantities, nor did it say how they might have
dealt with the possibility that either party might exercise a right to terminate the
contract. Nonetheless, the decision is consistent with the notion that the damages
would be the change in the value of the contract after the collapse of the
electricity market.
Take-or-pay contracts present a different problem. In a take-or-pay, the buyer
agrees to pay in each period for a minimum quantity, even if it does not take it. A
failure to take the minimum in a given period would not be a breach of the
contract; the buyer would simply be exercising its option. However, a failure to
pay would be a breach, and the damages would be the contract price in that
period multiplied by the difference between the amount taken and the minimum
quantity. If the buyer repudiated its subsequent obligations, then there would be a
breach. Damages would be for the future minimum obligation subject to the
possibility that it could sell the goods to a third-party. The remedy would be the
same as for Nipsco or Tractebel. The same remedy would hold if the contract set
a minimum amount for, say, a three-year period. So, for example, in the wellknown case of Lake River v. Carborundum,78 if the three-year period had
elapsed, the damages would be for the price multiplied by the shortfall, although
Judge Posner held otherwise. If, however, the buyer anticipatorily repudiated the
contract, the damage measure would have to take into account the seller’s ability
to sell the goods to a third party.

76. Tractebel I, 2005 WL 1863853, at *16.
77. Tractebel II, 487 F.3d at 112.
78. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985). For more detail, see
GOLDBERG, RETHINKING CONTRACT LAW AND CONTRACT DESIGN, supra note 3, at 71–86 and GOLDBERG,
RETHINKING THE LAW OF CONTRACT DAMAGES, supra note 3, at 28–29.
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IV. THE GOLDEN VICTORY AND POST-BREACH FACTS
The House of Lords confronted the question of whether post-breach facts
should be taken into account when assessing damages in The Golden Victory.79
Citing a century old non-contract case, 80 it concluded that they should: “Why
should he listen to conjecture on a matter which has become an accomplished
fact? Why should he guess when he can calculate? With the light before him,
why should he shut his eyes and grope in the dark?” 81 The Golden Victory was
subsequently ratified by the Supreme Court in Bunge SA v. Nidera BV.82 The
post-breach fact in each case was the occurrence of a force majeure event.
Unfortunately, both decisions are wrong. Perhaps it is too late to do anything
about it, but I hope that “with the light before them” the Court will see fit to
reverse course in a future decision.
In July 1998, the owner of the Golden Victory chartered the tanker to a
Japanese company for seven years. The charter included a clause that was in use
for all time charters for tankers likely to visit the Gulf:
If war or hostilities break out between any two or more of the following
countries: USA, former USSR, PRC, UK, Netherlands, Liberia, Japan,
Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, both owners and charterers shall
have the right to cancel this charter. Either party, however, shall not be
entitled to terminate this charter on account of minor and/or local
military operation or economic warfare anywhere which will not
interfere with the vessel’s trade. 83
The hire rate was initially set at $31,500 per day, increasing by a formula not
included in the decision. In addition, the owner would receive a share of the
profits over the base rate. In December 2001, following a sharp decline in the
market for ship charters, the charterer repudiated; three days later, the owner
accepted the repudiation. In a September 2002 interim declaratory award, the
arbitrator found there had been a breach, and the earliest contractual date for
redelivery would have been in December 2005. The damage measurement issue
was not decided until October 2004. That gap turned out to be significant since
the second Gulf War began in March 2003. Had the contract still been in effect,
the war clause would have been triggered and the charterer would have exercised
its right to terminate.
The owner claimed that the termination date for measuring damages should
79. Golden Strait Corp v Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory), [2007] UKHL 12,
[2007] 2 AC 353 at ¶ 1.
80. Bwllfa and Merthyr Dare Steam Collieries (1891) Ltd v. Pontypridd Waterworks Co. [1903] AC 426,
431HL (E).
81. The Golden Victory, [2007] UKHL 12, at ¶ 65.
82. [2015] UKSC 43 at ¶ 23.
83. The Golden Victory, [2007] UKHL 12, at ¶ 50.
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be December 2005. The charterer argued that, since it would have exercised its
termination option in March 2003, it should only be liable for damages through
March 2003. The arbitrator agreed, as did the judges in the commercial court, the
Court of Appeal, and, finally, in the House of Lords (in a 3–2 split). The
arbitrator took evidence from experts on whether in December 2001 the war was
merely a possibility or was probable or inevitable. The owner argued that the
“loss is crystallised at the date of breach and an arbitrator or court should not
look at post-breach events in making the assessment. The only exception to this
rule was where the subsequent event could be seen at the crystallisation date to
be inevitable or ‘predestined.’”84
In his dissent, Lord Bingham noted that if the damages had been calculated at
the time the liability decision had been made, the Gulf War would not yet have
occurred, and, presumably, the arbitrator would have had no difficulty awarding
damages for the last two-plus years of the charter. Could the charterer then have
come back to the arbitrator and asked for a refund for the last two years?
Presumably the arbitrator and the majority would have rejected such a claim,
perhaps invoking “finality.” But why make the remedy depend on the length of
the damages phase of the proceedings? War was only one of the many risks that
might have impacted the value of the charter. If the market price for charters
collapsed, should the charterer’s damages be increased to take into account the
latest conditions? If not, which post-breach, pre-decision factors should a court
take into account when reckoning damages?
The charter was an asset of the owner and the problem was to determine the
value of the asset at the time of the breach with or without the breach. The
complicated pricing formula—indexing and profit sharing—made that more
difficult, but the complications were independent of the timing question. Lord
Mance (Court of Appeal) recognized that the contract was an asset, but failed to
understand the implications: “But the element of uncertainty, resulting from the
war clause, meant that the owners were never entitled to absolute confidence that
the charter would run for its full seven-year period. They never had an asset
which they could bank or sell on that basis.”85 That’s half right; the value of all
assets is entirely determined by the future, and the future is, by definition,
uncertain. That does not mean that the assets cannot be valued. We do it all the
time. The majority wrongly suggested that the war clause made the duration of
the charter (and therefore its value) uncertain: “Where there is a suspensive
condition such as a war clause, however, the duration of the charter was always
uncertain, depending on a contingency of the occurrence of an event which was
by definition within the contemplation of the parties.” 86 By that reasoning, every
contract with a force majeure clause—indeed, every contract—would be at risk.
84. Id. at ¶ 58.
85. Golden Strait Corp. v. Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory) [2006] 1 WLR 533,
543–44.
86. Id. at ¶ 59.
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Valuing the asset would, by necessity, take into account the possibility that
the war clause would come into play and that one of the parties would exercise
its cancellation option. If at the time of the breach war was a low probability
event, the discount would have been minor. Conversely, if the breach occurred at
the beginning of March 2003, the value of the asset would have been close to
zero. A simple analogy might be helpful. Suppose a company is litigating a
patent claim. If it were to win, the share value would be $100 and if it were to
lose, the share value would be $0. If the chance of winning is 50:50, the value of
the stock on the eve of decision is $50. Post-decision it would be $0 or $100.
Varying the probabilities would alter the stock price; if winning were
“predestined,” the stock price would approach $100, and if it were exceedingly
unlikely, it would approach $0. The likelihood of a future event at the time of the
breach—whether remote, predestined, or something in between—is one of the
determinants of the value of the asset.
The Lords’ failure to comprehend this point is illustrated in Lord Brown’s
opinion:
Shift the facts here and assume that the arbitrator had found, as at
December 2001, a probability (or even merely a significant possibility)
of (perhaps imminent) war breaking out in the Gulf, but that in fact, by
the time damages finally came to be assessed, not only had war not
broken out but all risk of it had disappeared—or, indeed, the assessment
might not have taken place until the whole nominal term of the
charterparty had expired. On the view taken by the minority of your
Lordships, the damages award would have had to reflect a risk which
never in fact eventuated, a conclusion in the circumstances, greatly to the
owner’s disadvantage. Yet that inescapably is the logic of the minority’s
approach.87
And that is how it should be. Markets take future risk into account,
incorporating the best information at the time of the breach. If the likelihood of
the particular event changes over time or, as in this instance, the event comes to
pass, the market will reflect those changes. If the news turns out to be better than
had been anticipated (Brown’s no war scenario), the measured damages at the
time of the breach would have been below the measurement at the time of the
decision. And if the news turns out to be worse, as in the actual case, the
measured damages at the time of breach would exceed those at the time of the
decision. Whether the losses were probable or predestined would be determined
by the market, not by after-the-fact expert testimony on predestination.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed The Golden Victory in Bunge SA v. Nidera
BV. In 2010, Bunge (the seller) agreed to sell 25,000 metric tons of Russian
milling wheat crop (FOB Novorossiysk). The contract was entered into on June
87. Id. at ¶ 84.
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10, 2010 with delivery to be made between August 23, 2010 and August 30,
2010. The contract price was $160 per metric ton but by August 11, the price of
wheat on the world market had risen to between $280 and $285. On August 5,
Russia introduced a legislative embargo on exports of wheat from its territory,
which was to run from August 15 to December 31, 2010. The contract included a
prohibition clause:
In case of . . . any executive or legislative act done by or on behalf of the
government of the country of origin . . . restricting export, . . . any such
restriction shall be deemed by both parties to apply to this contract . . .
and to that extent this contract or any unfulfilled portion thereof shall be
cancelled.88
On August 9, the seller jumped the gun, notifying the buyer that because of
the embargo the contract was cancelled; the buyer rejected this on August 11,
claiming that the seller had repudiated the contract, and it then accepted the
repudiation. The seller then offered to reinstate the contract, but the buyer
claimed that it was too late. It claimed damages for the difference between the
contract price and the market price of wheat on August 11, totaling $3,062,500.
The arbitration panel found that the premature invocation of the prohibition
clause amounted to a breach which the buyer had accepted. It was possible that
Mr. Putin might have changed his mind before August 30, it held, so it would
have been possible that Bunge could have performed. In the subsequent stages of
litigation, that finding was upheld, and I will not pursue that issue. The remaining
issue concerned damages: had the buyer suffered any damages and, if so, how
would they be measured? Should the fact that the embargo remained in place
after August 30 be taken into account?
The initial arbitration panel refused to award damages, holding that the buyer
had suffered none. The decision took into account post-breach information,
namely that the embargo remained in effect on August 23–30, so the contract
would have been excused. The arbitration Appeal Board reversed, measuring
damages on the date of breach ($3,062,500) and ignoring the subsequent
information. On appeal, the Judge was Nicholas Hamblen who had been losing
counsel in The Golden Victory. He affirmed the decision and distinguished The
Golden Victory by noting that it involved an installment contract whereas the
Bunge-Nidera contract was a one-off.89 His decision was affirmed by a
unanimous Court of Appeal. However, in a unanimous opinion, the Supreme
Court reversed, awarding the buyer nominal damages of $5.90
None of the decisions say what happened to the wheat. Did Bunge manage to
sell it on the world market prior to August 15? Could it? Or did it have to sell in
88. Bunge SA v. Nidera BV [2015] UKSC at ¶ 2.
89. Id. at ¶ 54–55.
90. Id. at ¶ 36.
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Russia at whatever price prevailed in that market after August 30? Russian prices
were below the world price at the time of the initial contract and at the time of
the breach. As it happened, the Russian price differential remained roughly the
same while the embargo was in effect. 91 The post-embargo Russian price, while
lower than the world price, was substantially higher than the contract price. So,
Bunge made a substantial profit regardless of whether it sold in Russia or in the
world market. Doctrinally that might not matter, but there is at least a strong hint
in the Supreme Court decision that it was influenced by concern for unfairness to
Bunge if it were to have to pay damages. In fact, Bunge had made a significant
profit.
The contract was on the Grain and Feed Trade Association’s (GAFTA) 49
standard form contract, designed for contracts for the delivery of goods from
central and Eastern Europe in bulk or bags. The contract included a “default
clause” that set out how damages should be measured in the event of a default.
To avoid confusion, I will call this a “damage clause,” reserving the term default
to mean the rule that would apply in the absence of contract language that would
govern the situation. Damages would be the contract-market differential at the
time of the breach. This appeared to conflict with the Justices’ view that the
compensation principle would result in no damages since the embargo remained
in force during the delivery period. Lord Sumption resolved this by claiming that
the damage clause somehow did not cover this situation: “[I]n my opinion, clause
20 neither addresses nor excludes the consideration of supervening events (other
than price movements) which operate to reduce or extinguish the loss.” 92
The damage clause read: “The damages payable shall be based on, but not
limited to the difference between the contract price and either the [cover price] or
upon the actual or estimated value of the goods on the date of default.” 93 The
arbitration panel (and presumably the court) interpreted that to mean the price of
the goods on the date of the breach, but there is ambiguity as to what that is. It
should be the forward price of wheat on August 1l (the day of the breach) for
wheat to be delivered between August 23 and August 30. But which wheat? All
the judges appear to have assumed that it was the forward price on August 11 of
wheat in the world market. But that makes no sense. It is inconsistent with the
existence of the prohibition clause which only applied to Russian wheat. The
relevant price should be the price of Russian wheat in the world market. That
price would reflect the likelihood that the embargo might not be lifted before
August 30. The “estimated value of the goods on the date of default” would have
to take into account the likelihood on August 11 that the embargo would be
lifted, and Russian wheat would have been deliverable outside Russia in the last

91. See George Welton, The Impact of Russia’s 2010 Grain Export Ban, GEOWEL RESEARCH (June 28,
2011),
https://oi-files-d8-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/file_attachments/rr-impact-russiasgrain-export-ban-280611-en_3.pdf.
92. Bunge SA v. Nidera BV [2015] UKSC at ¶ 32.
93. Id. at ¶ 2.
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week of August.
The decisions do not say why Bunge jumped the gun. Perhaps it was just
careless talk and Bunge had no expectation of benefitting from an early
termination. That is at least plausible, given its attempt to retract. If, however, a
proper inquiry concluded that as of August 11 it was not feasible to sell the wheat
to the world market by August 15, and the probability that Mr. Putin would
change his mind before August 30 was very close to zero, then the contract value
at the time of the breach would have taken this into account. The price of Russian
wheat in the world market for delivery before the end of August would not have
been around $280; it would have been close to zero. Certainly, it would have
been well below the contract price of $160. This measure would be akin to the
damages in The Golden Victory context had the charterer repudiated in early
March 1993. The probability of war would have been high in the one case, as
was the continuation of the embargo in the other, and the contract in either case
would have been discounted to close to zero. The Supreme Court’s result—i.e.,
nominal damages—was correct. But the path to that result was wrong. The court
could have arrived there while still honoring the damage clause and rejecting The
Golden Victory.
In Bunge, Lord Sumption rejected the notion of the contract-as-asset:
The minority [in The Golden Victory] . . . considered that one should
value not the chartered service which would actually have been
performed, but the charterparty itself, assessed at the time that it was
terminated, by reference to the terms of a notional substitute concluded
as soon as possible after the termination of the original. That would vary,
not according to the actual outcome, but according to the outcomes
which were perceived as possible or probable at the time that the notional
substitute contract was made. . . . [T]he common law [principles] are
concerned with the price of the goods or services which would have been
delivered under the contract. They are not concerned with the value of
the contract as an article of commerce in itself.94
He gave no reason as to why the change in the value of the contract should
not be relevant.
In The Golden Victory and Bunge, the court focused on the virtues of
resolving the uncertainty: “With the light before him, why should he shut his
eyes and grope in the dark?” The downside of this is that the decisions increase
uncertainty in a different dimension. If some subsequent events would result in
reckoning damages at the moment of decision, but not others, then each party
will have an incentive to argue for the rule favoring it when it is no longer behind
the veil of ignorance, and courts will have to determine on an ad hoc basis which
cases warrant taking subsequent events into account. As Summers and Kramer
94. Id. at ¶ 21.
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note:
The formulae put forward for departing from the breach date rule are
hopelessly vague. According to three leading House of Lords decisions,
the breach date rule may be departed from “if to follow it would give rise
to injustice”, “where it is necessary in order adequately to compensate
the plaintiff”, or where it is “necessary or just to do so in order to give
effect to the compensatory principle.” And so, on the conventional
approach, judges are presented with an apparently unguided discretion
which rests on unspecified concepts of justice and compensation.95
The problem with The Golden Victory and its spawn is, as Summers and
Kramer say, the unguided discretion and the ad hoc exceptions it allows.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The premise of this article is that the default rule for determining direct
damages when the buyer or seller fails to perform should be the change in the
value of the contract at the time of the breach. For standardized commodities
traded in thick markets this is straightforward—the only question being whether
the new contract price is the spot price or the forward price. I have applied the
notion to problems in both American and English law.
In the United States, one problem is that there is an apparent difference
between two UCC remedies, the contract/market differential and cover.
However, once we recognize that cover, or any subsequent contract, should be
treated as evidence of the market price and not a separate remedy, the problem
goes away. To be clear, there is no reason why there has to be any subsequent
transaction. If the buyer were to choose not to replace the transaction, the
damages should be determined by finding the market price. Correspondingly, in
England, the Sale of Goods Act appears to distinguish between cases in which
there is an available market and those where there is not. The courts have
proffered a number of unsatisfactory definitions of an available market but have
not really come to grips with the notion that the exercise is irrelevant. Again, the
problem is to determine the price at the time of the breach, regardless of whether
the non-breaching party entered into a subsequent transaction.
The second problem concerned the role of post-breach information. In the
United States, the cover question is also implicated. The evidentiary quality of a
cover transaction weakens as the gap between breach and the alleged cover
transaction grows. American courts have come to different conclusions with
regard to an anticipatory repudiation. While some would argue for using the price

95. Andrew Dyson & Adam Kramer, There is No “Breach Date Rule”: Mitigation, Difference in Value
and Date of Assessment, 130 L.Q. REV. 259, 261 (2014) (Dyson changed his last name to Summers after this
article was published).
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at the time of performance, others would look to the price when the repudiation
was accepted. I have argued that the appropriate price would be the forward price
when the repudiation was accepted, rather than the spot price. In the more
complicated cases of long-term contracts, the value of the contract captures all
the relevant features of the contract—variable price and quantity, early
termination rights, etcetera.
In England, while the general rule has been to use the time of the breach, the
Supreme Court has endorsed an exception. If a force majeure event would have
occurred between the time of breach and the performance date, in The Golden
Victory and Bunge, the highest court took into account whether the force majeure
event occurred. In both cases, the court failed to appreciate that the likelihood of
the occurrence would have been factored in to determine the market price at the
time of the breach. In the former case, the probability was very low, and the price
was likely not discounted. In the latter case, the likelihood was extremely high.
Had the court recognized that the relevant price was for Russian wheat sold
outside Russia, the price would have been heavily discounted so that the damages
would have been zero.
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